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Summary findings
The most striking fact about the economic geography of  underdevelopment  at the international, national, and
the world is the uneven spatial distribution of economic  subcontinental levels.
activity, including the coexistence of economic  They review the theoretical and empirical work that
development and underdevelopment. High-income  illuminates how the spatial relationship between
regions are almost entirely concentrated in a few  economic units changes and conclude that geography
temperate zones, half of the world's  GDP is produced by  matters for development, but that economic growth is
15 percent of the world's population,  and 54 percent of  not governed by a geographic determinism. New
the world's GDP is produced by countries occupying just  economic centers can develop, and the costs of
10 percent of the world's  land area. The poorest half of  remoteness can be reduced.
the world's population produces only 14 percent of the  Many explicit policy instruments have been used to
world's GDP, and  17 of the poorest  20 nations are in  influence location decisions. But none has been
tropical Africa. The unevenness is also manifest within  systematically successful, and many have been very
countries and within metropolitan concentrations of  costly-in  part because they were based on inappropriate
activity.  expectations. Moreover, many ostensibly nonspatial
Why are these spatial differences in land rents and  policies that benefit specific sectors and households have
wages not bid away by firms and individuals in search of  spatial consequences since the targeted sectors and
low-cost or high-income locations? Why does economic  households are not distributed uniformly across space.
activity cluster in centers of activity? And what are the  These nonspatial policies can sometimes dominate
consequences of remoteness from existing centers?  explicitly spatial policies. Further  work is needed to
Henderson, Shalizi, and Venables argue that  better understand these dynamics in developing
understanding these issues is central for understanding  countries.
many aspects of economic development and
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The most striking  fact about  the economic  geography  of the world is the uneven
distribution  of activity. High-income  regions  are almost  entirely  concentrated  in a few
temperate  zones, 50%  of world GDP is produced  by 15%  of the world's population,  and
54% by countries  occupying  just 10%  of the world's land  area. The poorest  half of the
world population  produces 14%  of world  GDP, and 17  of the poorest  20 nations  are in
tropical  Africa. The unevenness  is also manifest  within countries,  with metropolitan
concentrations  of activity. The share  of the population  of developing  countries  in urban
areas has increased  dramatically  in recent years;  Latin  American  countries  (as European
and North American  ones) are 75% urbanized,  and while  Asian countries  are under 30%
urbanized  their urban  populations  are growing  at around  4% pa.
Why do these spatial  inequalities  exist, and why are spatial  differences  in land
rents and wages  not bid away  by firms  and individuals  in search  of low cost or high
income  locations? The answers  to this question  have to do partly with spatial  variations
in institutions  and endowments  (natural  endowments  and accumulated  human  and
physical  capital), and partly also to do with geography  - the spatial  relationship  between
economic  units.' There are two key (and related)  geographical  questions. Why do so
many economic  decision  takers choose  to locate  close  to each other? And, for those that
cannot  locate in an economic  center,  what are the consequences  of being outside,  and
possibly  remote from,  existing  centers?
This paper argues that understanding  these two issues  is central  for understanding
many aspects  of economic  development  and underdevelopment.  At the international
level it is important  for understanding  the forces  shaping  the location  decisions  of firms,
and the consequent  demand  for labor and pattern  of cross-country  wage differentials. At
the national  and sub-national  it is important  for understanding  the processes  driving
urbanization  and the evolving  internal  economic  geography  of countries  and cities during
their development. And  at the policy level,  it is important  for understanding  the
contributions  of international  trading arrangements,  of regional  policies,  and of public
infrastructure  investments  in shaping  the location  of economic  activities  and thereby
promoting  development.
1This paper reviews some of the recent theoretical and empirical work that
illuminates these issues. In the next section we overview analytical issues, and then turn
to a review of empirical work.  This looks first (section 3) at the consequences of being
remote from established centers, concentrating on the international setting.  Section 4
turns to empirical work on the forces that drive agglomeration, where evidence is from
intra-country, particularly urban, studies.  Section 5 delves further into urban issues,
looking both at the evolution of cities in developing countries, and at the issue of over-
urbanization.  Section 6 turns to policy.  Here we are much more speculative, but argue
that a number of key policy issues need to be analyzed from a rigorous geographical
perspective, and that further research needs to be done on these issues.
2:  Analytical  issues:
2.1 Agglomeration; sources and consequences
Why is economic activity so concentrated? The presence of transport costs
suggests that industry might spread out to minimize the costs of reaching consumers in
different locations, and if production takes place under conditions of constant or
diminishing returns to scale, then this is exactly what economics predicts.  The 'folk
theorem'  of spatial economics says that under these conditions there will be very many
small plants supplying local markets.  It is only the presence of increasing returns to scale
which forces firms to concentrate production in relatively few locations, and thus
confronts them with the choice of where to operate a,"'.
Agglomeration forces  and dispersion  forces:
The increasing returns that are necessary for agglomeration may be either extemal
to the firm or internal.  External mechanisms include knowledge spillovers and
externalities arising in the labor market. For example, information spillovers can arise
with neighboring firms; by observing them and learning about what they are doing, firms
learn about technological developments, whom to buy from and sell to, whom to hire,
what product lines are selling, and the like (see Eberts and McMillen 1999 for a review).
In the labor market, there may be gains from locating in a thick labor market, and in a
2location where other firms have already trained a supply of skilled workers (Marshall,
1890, Krugman 1991b)
External economies create incentives for firms to locate close to each other, and
so too can internal economies of scale.  Firms' location decisions are based both on input
price considerations and on ease of access to markets.iV  Consider first market access.
Firms want to locate close to demand (or, more generally, in locations from which
transport networks make it relatively cheap to reach markets) and models generally yield
the result that increasing returns activities are pulled disproportionately towards locations
with good market access. For example, if there are 9 locations, 8 of which have 10% of
final expenditure and 1 of which has 20% then, other things being equal, more than 20%
of manufacturing supply will be met from this larger location as firms locate to exploit
the benefit of proximity to the large market.  This immediately creates a force for
agglomeration of activity.  As a disproportionate share of manufacturing is attracted to a
location so either the wage rate in the location is bid up or labor is attracted to immigrate
- either of which will tend to increase this location's share of total expenditure still
further. The market access effect is sometimes called the 'home market effect',  and this
combined with labor mobility is the basis of Krugman's seminal 1991  a paper.v
A second force comes from combining market access with intermediate goods
production.  Demand for manufacturing comes not just from final consumers but also
from intermediate demand, so a location with a lot of firms will have a high demand for
intermediates, making it an attractive location for intermediate producers.  This in turn
makes it an attractive location for firms that use these intermediate goods, as they can
economize on transport costs on inputs.  There is thus a positive feedback between
location decisions of upstream and downstream firms, tending to draw both types of firms
together in the same location, so leading to agglomeration. i  These forces are just the
backwards (demand) and forward (cost) linkages that figured so prominently in an earlier
generation of development economics (in particular the writings of Hirschman 1958 and
Myrdal 1957). However, as we have already remarked, these effects can only really
matter in an environment of increasing returns to scale, without which upstream and
downstream firms could be broken into many small plants.
3Agglomeration forces can operate across more or less broad ranges of activity.
For exarnple, the key externalities and linkages might occur between firms in a particular
industry or between firns  that engage in a narrow field of R&D. Alternatively they
might operate at a much broader level - through aggregate demand as a whole, the
development of general labor skills, or the provision of basic business infrastructure and
inputs used by wide sectors of the economy. It is also argued that they may stem not
from specialization but from diversity in the activities of a location (Jacobs 1969).
Pulling in the opposite direction are forces for dispersion.  These are of essentially
three types.  One is negative externalities from congestion. Another is the supply of
immobile factors, the prices of which will be bid up in centers of activity, encouraging
firms to move to lower factor cost locations. And the third is the extent of the market,
limited by the presence of geographically dispersed demand for output.  Thus, if labor is
dispersed it encourages a dispersed location of firms for both supply and demand reasons.
The importance of these dispersion forces depends critically on what factors are
immobile, and what mobile. In a regional context labor might be mobile, and land the
only immobile factor. Agglomeration then causes labor movement (eg to cities), until
choked off by congestion costs or land prices. In an international context most sorts of
labor are immobile, so agglomeration will bid up the price of labor as well as land. This
discourages agglomeration, but means that when it occurs it will be associated with
international income inequalities.
Outcomes:
Outcomes are determined by the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces.
Theoretical modeling establishes the dependence of this balance on model parameters,
and shows how small parameter changes can lead to discontinuous changes in the
configuration of equilibria. Thus, for some values of parameters a model may predict that
economic activity will be dispersed between locations. This configuration is robust until a
bifurcation point is reached, at which point the dispersed equilibrium becomes unstable.
If one location gains further activity then positive feedback (which in the earlier spatial
literature was referred to as the process of cumulative causation) causes further activity to
be drawn in, forming an agglomeration.
4For example, if transport and communication costs are very high then activity
must be dispersed; (under autarky every location must have its own industry to meet final
demand).  And if transport costs are extremely low, then firms will not care whether they
are close to markets and suppliers; (if transport and communications are costless we
encounter the end of geography).  So it is at intermediate levels of transport costs that the
likelihood of agglomeration is greatest. This is often presented in the models as an
application of 'symmetry breaking'.  At high enough transport costs all locations are
identical, but as costs fall below a critical value the model goes through a bifurcation, at
which point the economic geography of the world self-organizes into a structure of
centers of activity, with intermediate hinterland areas. Further declines in transport costs
may lead to erosion of this structure.
Typically many locations are candidates for hosting the agglomeration, and small
initial differences (or historical chance, or self-fulfilling expectations) determine which
gains it.  However, once a site has become a center of activity, then a 'lock-in'  effect
operates.  Even if exogenous circumstances change (perhaps reducing the attractiveness
of the site) economic agents will not want to move away and forego the benefits of the
agglomeration.  This tendency will be accentuated by the durability of sunk cost
investments, such as plant and infrastructure. There is therefore a path dependency in the
structure of the equilibrium, with history being as important as current circumstances.
In our discussion of agglomeration and dispersion forces we distinguished
according to the breadth of activities drawn together by agglomeration forces, and
according to the mobility of factors of production (often corresponding to an intra- vs
inter-national distinction). Different combinations of these cases apply in different
situations, generate different outcomes, and correspond to different strands in the
literature.  Table 1 illustrates some of the possibilities.
If agglomeration forces operate primarily within particular industries and most
factors are mobile, then the likely outcome is agglomeration of industries in specialized
locations (top left cell of table 1). Inter-locational factor price differences are small, both
because each of these centers only contains a small fraction of possible activities, and
because many factors are mobile.  The classic model of this type is that of Henderson
(1974), who constructs a general equilibrium model of a system of specialized cities.
5Two extremes are analyzed -- a world of developers who set up competitive cities
potentially achieving efficient outcomes, and a world without "large agents " (developers)
where cities (of generally excessive size) form through "self-organization."
At the other extreme, if linkages operate at a much broader level and factors
(especially labor) are immobile then agglomeration, if it occurs, will be associated with
inequalities in factor prices and real incomes (bottom right cell of table 1). Thus, in the
international model of Krugman and Venables (1995) industrial activity concentrates in
'north', even though wages may be many times higher there than in 'south';  firms are
deterred from moving south because agglomeration benefits foregone might outweigh
labor cost savings. This view of the world is radically different from that of conventional
international economics, predicting that the world divides into rich and poor regions,
even if there are no international differences in factor endowments, skill levels,
institutional quality or other underlying economic characteristics. Development and
under-development are simply manifestations of agglomeration of economic activity.
Table 1: Agglomeration: forces and outcomes
Dispersion forces
Weak  Strong
(eg factors mobile)  (eg factors immobile)
Agglomeration  Narrow,  City specialization  Industrial clusters vs.
forces  (eg intra-  (Henderson 1974)  comparative advantage
industry)  (Fujita, Krugman, Venables
1999, chapter 16)
Broad, (eg  City formation  World income inequalities
aggregate  (Fujita 1988)  (Krugman and Venables
demand)  1995)
2.2:  The formation of new centers.
Agglomeration mechanisms are one way to explain the observed unevenness in the
spatial distribution of activity and income. Development must then take the form either
of mitigating the disadvantages of being outside existing centers, or of the creation of
new centers of activity.  What does this approach have to say about the birth of new
centers?  This question has typically been addressed by supposing that there is some
6exogenous growth process - population or technical change - and showing how this will
create new centers of activity.
In the urban context, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) show how rising
population will lead to the birth of new cities. Population growth expands the
agricultural hinterland surrounding existing cities, and at some point it becomes
profitable for a new frontier city to develop. Continuing growth will lead to the
development of multiple cities, spaced out from each other and locked into their
locations.
In the international context, Puga and Venables (1999) model the spread of an
agglomeration from country to country.vi"  They suppose that world demand for
manufactures is increasing (due perhaps to exogenous technical progress), and tending to
widen the wage gap between countries with industry and those without. There comes a
point at which the wage gap is too large to be sustainable, and manufacturing begins to
move out of established centers to low wage regions. However, just one (or a few) new
industrial centers will become established at a time.  The logic is as we have already seen.
An equilibrium with dispersed industry is unstable; any location that gets just slightly
ahead of the others gains from forward and backward linkages, these positive feedbacks
causing the location to develop faster and the others to fall back.  Development therefore
takes the form of enlargement of the set of countries that are in the 'center',  while most
countries remain outside, largely unaffected. As the growth process continues, so
enlargement of the set of 'central'  countries proceeds sequentially, adding countries in
turn.  The approach predicts that development is not a process of steady convergence of
poor countries to rich ones, but instead the rapid transition of selected countkies from the
poor club to the rich club.
Which countries are most likely to make this transition? It may be determined by
very small initial cross-country differences (indeed, if all countries were identical, it
would simply be a matter of chance).  The pertinent dimensions of difference are those
which determine the profitability of the first firms to relocate, so include labor market
factors, internal infrastructure (Martin and Rogers 1995), as well as institutional
characteristics of the country.  Since the first entrants will be highly dependent on
7imported intermediate and capital goods and on export markets for final sales, they will
tend to go to locations close (or with good transport links) to established centers.
A further issue concerns the industrial structure of these newly industrializing
economics.  What sectors do they attract first, and how does their industrial structure
change during development? The first sectors to become detached from an existing
agglomeration will typically be those that are intensive in immobile primary factors (the
prices of which are high in the center), and that are not too heavily dependent on linkages
with other firms.  These may be firms with low usage of intermediate goods, low levels
of sales to other industrial sectors, or that do not need to cluster with related activities to
gain new technology. As these sectors relocate, so they may begin to create linkages and
attract other sectors.  The sequence in which industries enter then depends on their factor
intensities, their tradability, and the way in which they benefit from linkages to other
activities, and create their own linkage effects.
The message then, is that new centers of activity can develop, but the process is
not one of steady convergence of all locations. Instead, it is rapid development of a few
locations, leaving others essentially unaffected. This fits well with the historical record.
Recent decades have seen a small group of countries make a rapid transition from being
amongst the low income group to join the middle- or high-income countries, while
divergence has continued between high-income and the great majority of low income
countries (Quah 1997). Furthermore, growth performance is much more variable across
countries than is accumulation of either physical or human capital (Easterly and Levine
1  999).
2.3:  Regional structure and the costs of distance:
Although new centers can form, most locations remain outside. What determines the
structure of activity outside established centers, and the magnitude of the income penalty
to being outside?
The costs of distance from an established center arise essentially because of the
costs of trading goods with, and receiving information and technology from, the center.
These costs will impact entirely on immobile factors, and if these account for a small
share of production costs, then even quite low transport costs can have a large effect on
8their prices. The classic analysis of this is von Thunen (1826).  A city is located in the
center of a 'featureless plain'  and labor is mobile between the city and agricultural
employment in the surrounding area. Regions specialize - forming concentric circles of
activity - according to the transport intensity of the products, and transport costs
determine the rent gradient. Rents diminish steadily with distance since land - the only
immobile factor - bears all the costs.
If labor is immobile - or has frictional costs in moving - then it too will bear
some of the costs of distance.  An international application of the von Thunen model is
developed in Venables and Limao (1999) in which there are several immobile factors in
countries at increasing distances from an economic center.  The countries specialize
according to the interaction between two pairs of forces.  One is products' transport
intensity interacting with distance, as in von Thunen; the other is products'  factor
intensity interacting with countries' factor endowments, as in Heckscher-Ohlin trade
theory.  Real incomes decline with distance, although the prices of individual (immobile)
factors need not, as changing patterns of specialization influence factor demands.
3.  Geographical remoteness and underdevelopment
We turn now to empirical evidence, looking first at the international evidence on the
implications of being outside established centers. We then move on in following sections
to present evidence on agglomeration (based largely on intra-country studies) and also to
draw out the way in which the internal economic geography and urban structure of
economies change during development.
3.1: Transport costs, trade and income.
Transport costs incurred on traded goods are only one of the direct costs associated with
distance, although they are perhaps the one that is most readily observable.  They can be
measured by the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio giving the 'carriage, insurance and freight'  costs of
countries' imports, which typically range from a few percent of the value of trade, up to
30-40% for the most remote and landlocked (and typically African) economies.  More
direct measures provide a clearer measure of the cross-country variation in shipping
9costs.  For example, estimates of the cost of shipping a standard container from Baltimore
to selected West African destinations range from $3,000 to Cote d'Ivoire, to $7,000 to
Burkina Faso, up to $13,000 for the Central African Republic.  Limao and Venables
(1999) find that being landlocked raises transport costs by more than 50% (comparing the
median landlocked country with the median coastal economy), and an extra overland
kilometer costs as much as 7 additional sea kilometers. Infrastructure (and, for landlocked
economies, transit countries' infrastructure) also matters, so shipping to Austria or
Switzerland costs around $4,000, compared to $3,000-$3,500 for Germany and Belgium.
What are the consequences of transport costs of these magnitudes?  First, they are
a real cost, using up scarce resources.  Second, they choke off trade.  Gravity estimates of
bilateral trade flows use distance as a proxy for transport costs (and possibly also control
for countries sharing a common border and for language and cultural links), and typically
find elasticities of trade volumes with respect to distance of between -1  and -1.3.  This is
a large effect, indicating that doubling distance cuts trade volumes by between 1/2  and 2/3.
Combining gravity results with estimates of the elasticity of transport costs with respect
to distance, indicates that the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to transport costs is
around -2.5  (Limao and Venables 1999). Thus, doubling transport costs reduces trade
volume by around 80% and the median landlocked country has less than 40% of the trade
volume of the median coastal economy.  The trade reducing effect is strongest for
transport intensive activities - i.e., activities that are dependent upon exports for sales
and/or imported intermediate goods for production.  Radelet and Sachs (1999) find that
increasing a country's  c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio from 12% to 17% reduces the long term growth of
the share of non-primary manufactured exports in GDP by around 0.2% per annum.
Can levels of transport costs of these magnitudes go far towards explaining real
income differences of the magnitude we observe in the world, varying by up to 50 to 1?
Some simple arithmetic helps.  Suppose that a product sells for $100 in the 'center' and
uses intermediate inputs that cost $40, giving value added of $60, perhaps $15 of which
goes to capital and $45 to labor.  In a location which imports the intermediates and
exports the final product to the center, both at 30% ad valorem transport costs, the cost of
intermediates rises to $52 and receipts from output fall to $77, giving value added of $25.
Capital costs $15 (at least, supposing perfect access to the center's capital market),
10cutting the maximum possible return to labor to $10. Raising ad valorem transport costs
to 40% reduces value added to $15, less than the cost of the capital input.  These numbers
are not that extreme - firms in East Asian export processing zones typically have
imported inputs accounting for 60% of the value of their output, ranging up to nearly
80% in electronics.vi" The point is that transport costs which seem quite modest relative
to the value of gross output can be very large relative to value added attributable to
immobile factors of production.  Distance can then have a major impact on wages and per
capita incomes.
3.2: Investment and technology.
The spatial relationship between countries affects not only goods trade, but also other
forms of interaction.  Foreign direct investment flows follow a gravity relationship,
similar to trade flows.  Thus US FDI tends to be located relatively close to the US, and
estimates of the gravity coefficient on this investment are typically around -1, slightly
less than for trade.  Brainard (1997) uses the ratio of sales by affiliates to direct exports to
measure US FDI activity, and finds that the share of affiliate sales is lower the lower are
trade costs, and the lower is per worker income in the host country. Estimates based on
Swedish outflows of FDI suggest that the distance coefficient is more negative for FDI
than for trade, implying even greater sensitivity to distance (Ekholm 1998).
Just as trade and investment fall off sharply with distance from established
economic centers, so too does the transmission of technology.  Coe and Helpman (1995)
show how total factor productivity depends on both domestic and foreign (trade
weighted) stocks of R&D, and how the beneficial effects of foreign R&D on domestic
productivity are larger the more open the domestic economy. In their approach
geography enters via the trade weighting of foreign R&D stocks, although this weighting
is challenged by Keller (1998).  In recent work Keller (2000) relates total factor
productivity directly to distance from R&D producing countries.  He finds that, on
average, being 10% further away from a major R&D producing economy (such as the
US) reduces total factor productivity by around 0.  15%. While these studies give us some
valuable insights they are, unfortunately, restricted to OECD countries, and less is known
about the transmission of technology to developing countries.  Often FDI is such a
11vehicle, both directly and via spillovers to local firms (see Blomstrom and Kokko 1997
for a survey), and we have already seen the geographical concentration of FDI.
3.3:  Geography and per capita income:
How much of the cross-country inequality of per-capita income levels can be attributed to
a set of geographical variables, including some distance measures?  A statistical answer
to this question is provided by Gallup and Sachs (1999), who regress national per capita
income on four variables; a measure of the endowment of hydro-carbons per capita; a
dummy variable for incidence of malaria; the proportion of population who live within
1  OOkm  of the coast; and international transport costs, as measured by the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio
on imports.  They find that these four variables alone account for an astonishing 69% of
the per capita income variation across their sample of 83 countries. Looking at the
relationship between countries' per-capita income and distance from one of the three core
regions (taken to be New York, Rotterdam and Tokyo), they find that doubling distance
reduces income by around 25%.
Redding and Venables (2000) use a trade and geography framework to construct a
single summary measure of the maximum wage that firms in a country can afford to pay,
given their access to markets and to intermediate goods. They use a gravity model to
estimate the parameters of this 'wage equation', which becomes (like a traditional market
potential measure) essentially a function of the weighted average of country incomes,
weights being inversely related to distance and other geographical characteristics such as
landlockedness.  The relationship between this constructed wage measure and actual per
capita income is very tight, with the measure explaining over 66% of the cross-country
variation in per capita incomes.
Pulling together the evidence on the costs of being outside existing centers, it
seems clear that distance matters, impacting on trade, investment and income.  New
technologies, as well as trade liberalizing policies, are undoubtedly mitigating some of
these costs, but it is worth pointing out that many aspects of trade costs are not falling.
Hummels (1999) charts the path of ocean shipping costs and shows how these costs -
relative to other goods prices in the economy - have fluctuated, with no trend decrease
over the last few decades.ix
124.  Urbanization  and internal  structure
The previous  section  looked  at the costs of being geographically  distant  from existing
economic  centers. We now turn to the flip side of the coin, and review  the evidence  on
the productivity  benefits  that can be derived  from  being in a concentration  of activity.
The literature  is derived  almost  entirely  from intra-country  studies,  usually  focussing  on
cities.
4.1 Bases of agglomeration  and urbanization
There is a large and increasingly  sophisticated  empirical  literature  on the magnitude  of
the productivity  advantage  gained  by being located  in a center  of activity. Evidence
suggests  the externalities  in specific  manufacturing  industries  derive  mostly  from firms
doing  similar  activities  -- localization  economies.  Since this paper is concerned  primarily
with development  we cite results  from a recent study  of Korea. However,  the findings
are similar  for industrial  countries,  such  as the USA (e.g.,  Sveikauskas  1978,  Henderson
1988,  and Ciccone  and Hall, 1995),  and Japan (Nakamura,  1985),  as well as other
developing  countries,  such as Brazil  (Henderson,  1988)  and Indonesia  (Henderson  and
Kuncoro,  1996).
Table  2 shows  the magnitude  of localization  economies  for different  industries  in
Korea.  There,  a 1% increase  in local own industry  employment  results in a .06-.08%
increase  in plant output,  for a typical  industry.  So a plant in a city with 1,000  workers  in
other  firms  in the same industry  would,  without  changing  its own inputs,  increase  its
output  by 20-25%  by moving  to another  city with 15,000  workers  in the same industry,
creating  a big incentive  to agglomerate.  In Korea,  the rankings  of industries  by the
magnitude  of their externalities  follows  exactly  the ranking  of industries  by the extent  to
which  they are spatially  concentrated  across  cities.  So heavy and transport  industries  tend
to be concentrated  in a few highly specialized  cities  to take advantage  of these local scale
externalities,  while traditional  industries  with low  scale externalities  are more dispersed.
Similarly,  Henderson  (1988)  analyzes  the close  connection  between  the magnitude  of
13scale externalities for different industries in the USA and Brazil and the sizes of cities
that specialize in different industrial activities.
Recent work on the USA looks at details of how externalities affect different
types of firms. For high tech industries, using plant level productivity data, Henderson
(1  999a) finds that single plant firms benefit more than corporate plants from localization
economies, since corporate plants have their own internal information networks and are
less reliant on the external environment. He also finds evidence of dynamic externalities,
especially for single plant firms, in addition to static ones. With dynamic externalities the
past local industrial environment of a city affects productivity today, by contributing to
local knowledge accumulation-- a stock of local trade secrets. Locations with no history
of an industry are disadvantaged because there is no accumulated body of knowledge for
new plants to draw upon. Finally, he finds that for high tech production, local diversity
and scale of either the overall or the business service environment have no effect on
productivity, in contrast to results for less developed countries such as Korea and
Indonesia.  Similarly for new plants that are  foreign  owned  in Portugal, apart from
localization economies, Guimaraes, Figueiredo, and Woodward (2000) find such firms
benefit from locations with diversity and scale in business and financial services, but not,
most surprisingly in other foreign owned activity. For foreign owned firms, being able to
access domestic business services in a country they are unfamiliar with may be critical.
14Table 2: Evidence on Agglomeration Economies
Magnitude of External Economies of Scale for Korea
Localization  Diversity economies (% increase in
Industry  Locallzabon  productivity for one standard
Ind  yeconomies  (elasticity)  deviation increase in diversity)
Traditional (food, textile, apparel,  .021**  NA
wood  and paper  products  and furniture)
Heavy (basic and fabricated metals,  .082**  NA
chemicals and plastics)
Transport  .096**  NA
Machinery and Electrical Machinery  .053**  NA
High Tech (computer, communication,  .056**  .599**
TV, radio and scientific instruments)
**Coefficient significant at 5% level.
Table based on Henderson, Lee, and Lee (1999) [HLL] who estimate scale economies using city-industry
data for 1983, 1989, and 1991-93. They examine the determinants of value added per production worker
across cities by industry, controlling for capital per worker and accounting for time, city and sub-industry
fixed effects, with results on scale externalities reported in the table. In the column on localization
economies, a coefficient of .06-.08 means that a 1% increase in local own industry employment results in
a .06-.08% increase in plant output.  HLL found that measures of metro scale had no effect on
productivity in any industry. However for high tech industries a diversity measure did is important, a I
standard deviation increase in diversity of the local manufacturing base increasing productivity by 60%.
This accords with the intuition that "the bright lights" of diverse large metro areas, with cross-industry
fertilization of ideas, are important for new evolving high tech industries, but not standard ones.
In related work, indirect evidence on patterns of patent citations in Jaffe et al.
(1993) and on patterns of plant births in Rosenthal and Strange (1999) suggest that
information spillovers attenuate rapidly over space, requiring close spatial clustering--
dense industrial neighborhoods-- to be realized. Moreover technological developments in
communications are not reducing this need for "face-to-face" proximity and
communication. In fact, Gasper and Glaeser (1999) suggest that the technological
developments in communications complement and accentuate the need for more face-to-
face interactions!
In addition to these relatively narrow within industry links, there is also work
suggesting that the general education level of workers improves productivity in a plant,
accentuating the scale benefits of agglomeration by enriching the quality of local
information spillovers (Black and Henderson 1999b). In recent empirical work Moretti
(1999) explores this for the USA, solving some of the difficult data and econometric
15issues. He finds that a 1% increase in the supply of college graduates in a city raises the
productivity of high school drop-outs by 2.3%, of high school graduates by 1.4% and of
college graduates by 1.2%. Productivity in cities specialized in production intensive in
high skill workers benefits from localization economies, knowledge spillovers, and their
interaction.
These studies leave two main gaps in our knowledge. The first is to do with
service activities.  Econometric investigations of the productivity effects of scale
externalities have focused on manufacturing.  We have no direct evidence on the nature
or magnitude of scale economies in service activities, although some reasonable
inferences on these could be attempted by examining patterns of service agglomerations.
The second gap is that, as we saw in section 2, agglomeration can arise not only
because of direct technological spillovers, but also because of benefits from access to a
thick labor market, access to suppliers, and access to large markets.  Empirical work
quantifying these benefits still needs to be undertaken.x
4.2 Limits to City Sizes
Dispersion forces operate against agglomeration to constrain city sizes. As we have seen,
they include the congestion costs that can arise in cities, the prices of immobile factors,
and the extent of the market.
A number of studies quantify the costs to workers and firms of living and
operating in cities.  Based on UNCHS data, for a cross-section of 80-90 cities worldwide
(both OECD and LDCs), Henderson (1999b) calculates elasticities of 0.25 for both
average housing prices and commuting times with respect to metro area populations.
Thus housing prices and commuting times are each more than 100% higher in a metro
area of 5 million compared to one of 100,000 population.  These numbers are similar to
those in Rousseau (1995) which indicate that costs-of-living are about 90% higher in
Paris at 9 million people than in the typical French city.  Rousseau also notes that wages
for the typical worker are also about 90% higher (so real incomes across cities of
different sizes are similar). These differentials for both wages and costs of living have
also been found in other studies for the USA and Brazil (Henderson, 1988) and some
other countries in Latin America (Thomas, 1980).
16While urban theory focuses on land and labor costs as they increase with city size,
there are infrastructure and other capital costs associated with locating activity in dense
cities-- costs of road networks and utilities, as well as environmental costs.  Using data on
Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, Richardson (1987) calculates that the
investment costs of housing a family in a large metro area are at least three times those in
a village. Henderson (1  999b) shows that the ratio of public investment to GDP in
countries rises sharply at the stage when rates of urban population growth in countries
accelerate.  Quality of life measures (e.g., child mortality, pupil/teacher ratios in primary
school) deteriorate as urbanization accelerates and national public resources are strained.
A variety of studies link environmental degradation to metro area size; for example,
dense output of emissions of autos and plants leads to excessive concentrations of ground
level ozone and carbon oxides in large metro areas. Once rates of urban population
growth drop off in countries and country incomes are correspondingly higher, then these
conditions tend to improve.
5. Divergence and Convergence: Cities in Developing Countries.
Given the forces outlined above, what evidence is there on outcomes?  How has the
balance between agglomeration and dispersion shaped city growth in developing
countries?  In a 1965 paper, Williamson hypothesized that, in growing from low-income
levels, countries go first through a period of regional divergence and concentration of
development and industrialization in just a restricted portion/region of the country. The
restriction of development to a limited region conserves on scare economic infrastructure
(Hansen, 1990), such as roads, technical skill workers and managerial resources.  As
development proceeds, the original area of development becomes congested and subject
to diminishing returns to further investment and the country can afford to develop other
regions, with the requisite investments in infrastructure, institutions, and human
resources. That leads to industrial deconcentration, growth of hinterland regions, and a
move towards regional convergence. This general hypothesis has been investigated both
for regions of a country and for patterns of convergence among the cities of a country.
175.1  Regional Convergence.
Regional convergence in more developed contexts of the USA, Europe, and Japan has
been the subject of wide analysis.xi  For the USA and Japan, Barro and Sala-i-Martin's
papers (1991, 1992) suggest that steady states are similar across regions, but rates of
convergence are slow.  In Japan, they find that low-income regions are catching up to
original higher income regions, through internal growth (not out-migration) of more
remote parts of Japan.  However Fujita and Tabuchi (1997) find evidence of more recent
core-periphery divergence. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) find that European states
seem to be converging to somewhat different steady states. More recent econometric
advances in analyzing growth patterns find faster rates of conditional convergence, but
perhaps greater steady-state differences (Caselli, Esquire, and Lefort, 1996).
Unfortunately there is a lack of comprehensive studies of regional convergence in
different countries at different stages of development, which would indicate for what
regions under what policy regimes and at what points in time there will be convergence.
5.2 Urban Convergence.
Evidence supports the view that the degree of national urban concentration rises
then falls with development.  Shishido and Wheaton (1982), Henderson (1988), Ades and
Glaeser (1995) and Henderson (1999c) all examine the pattern of national urban
concentration.  Shishido and Wheaton (1982) and Henderson (1999c) find national urban
concentration rises with growth from low income levels, peaks at low-middle income
levels (around 1987 PPP income per capita of $2500), and then declines.  So it seems that
Williamson's hypothesis holds for cities-- there is increasing concentration of resources in
one city (or a few cities in a large country) from low income levels, which at some point
in the growth process peaks and then declines.  Below in Section 5.4, we explore some of
the details of the process of deconcentration, discussing suburbanization and ex-urban
versus hinterland development and population versus industrial deconcentration.  In this
section we focus on key national issues concerning the level of urban concentration.
It is also useful to review what other factors affect urban concentration.
Geography matters.  Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Henderson (1999c) find primacy is
increased significantly by increases in national land area and population, or by having the
18primate city be a national capital or a port. In Henderson (1999c), openness of the
economy has a very small and ambiguous effect on national concentration. The effect of
an increase in political decentralization has a surprisingly small effect in reducing
concentration (under 10% of a standard deviation of primacy), although previous studies
Henderson (1988) and Ades and Glaeser (1995) find much bigger effects.
The policy instrument that seems critical in influencing national urban
concentration is investment in inter-regional transport infrastructure. As Gallup, Sachs,
and Mellinger (1999) suggest (historical) investments in national navigable waterways
induce inland habitation, significantly reducing urban concentration (Henderson 1999c).
Rosen and Resnick (1978) also find rail investment reduces national urban concentration.
In a more modem version, Henderson (1  999c) finds that investrnent in national roads and
highway systems significantly reduces national urban primacy, with the effect rising with
income.
There is a presumption in the academic literature and in the view of international
agencies (Renaud 1981) that there is a tendency to over-concentration in many countries,
especially rapidly urbanizing low-income countries. The UN (1993) asks how bad "the
negative factors associated with very large cities" need to get before [it is in the] self-
interest of those in control to encourage development of alternative centers." The
academic literature on the subject has three strands. The theoretical literature tends to
argue that in theoretical models stable city sizes can only be either efficient or too big, so
market failure may lead to too big cities. There is a cost benefit literature on the USA
(Tolley, Gardner and Graves 1979) and on developing countries (eg Richardson (1987)
which argues that the social marginal costs (congestion and commuting, environmental
costs, etc) of increasing city size exceed the social marginal benefits of scale at
equilibrium city sizes, again suggesting that cities are too large. Finally, and most
critically, there is a political-economy perspective on the subject.
Renaud (1981), Henderson (1988) and Ades and Glaeser (1995) argue that often
the political institutions in countries encourage over-concentration. The idea is that, in
many countries, there is a lack of a level playing field in the allocation of resources
across cities.  The national government can choose to favor one (or two) cities over
others.  Typically such cities are national capitals (Bangkok, Mexico City, Jakarta, or
19Seoul, not to mention Paris); but may also be a Sao Paulo, the seat of national elites.
Such favoritism can involve the allocation of local public services in favor of national
capitals, where decision-makers live. That problem can be exacerbated if hinterland
cities do not have the power (i.e. both the authority and financial resources) to determine
their own public service levels, either because of a unitary national constitution or
because local autonomy has been suspended (as in Korea from 1961 to the 1990's).
Favoritism can take the form of the national government choosing not to invest
sufficiently in interregional transport and telecommunications, so that hinterland cities
are less competitive locations for private producers. That favors producers and investors
(who may include national politicians) in the national capital. Favoritism, as in Indonesia
(Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996 and Kaiser, 1999) or in China or Brazil in the recent past,
can also take the form of restrictions in capital markets, export/import markets, and
licensing of production rights. These restrictions all favor firms which locate in the
national capital (or other favored mega-cities), allowing central bureaucrats and
politicians to extract rents in the allocation of loans and licenses without competition
from lower ranked bureaucrats in other locations. There may be also an "innocent" bias
towards locating production in mega-cities, as in Brazil or China, based on notions of
hierarchies in the allocation of technologies across cities and the inherent scale benefits
of larger cities. As stressed above, the issue is not whether larger cities offer greater scale
economies for all types of production, but, rather, what types of production benefit
sufficiently from being in large cities to compensate for the high costs of such cities.
All analyses tell us favored cities are oversized. Migrants and firms flow to a
favored city, until it becomes so congested and costly to live in that these costs offset the
advantages of the favoritism. Moreover, the excessive resources devoted to one or two
favored cities detract from the quality of life in the rest of the urban system. Based on the
UNCHS data set for 80-100 cities in 1996 worldwide, Henderson (1999b) shows that
high urban concentration in a primate city increases child mortality, pupil-teacher ratios,
use of non-potable water and other poor quality of life dimensions in typical medium size
metro areas, after accounting for size, income, and growth differences among cities.  For
example, a one-standard deviation increase in the national urban concentration measure
raises child mortality in typical cities by 1/3 of a standard deviation of the child mortality
20rate across cities in the sample. So the costs of excessive urban concentration in a primate
city are felt throughout the whole urban system, not just in very large cities.
5.3 Urban concentration and economic growth.
Putting all these analyses together, they suggest that there is an optimal degree of
urban concentration in a country, where too little means scale economies are inadequately
exploited and too much means that cities are too crowded and congested.
The effects of urban primacy on economic growth are tested directly in
Henderson (1999c), using panel data on primacy (interacted with per capita income and
national scale) and growth. Henderson finds that the growth maximizing degree of
primacy depends on income and national scale, with tight statistical fit. Table 3 gives the
growth maximizing primacy levels (% population in largest city), and illustrates that it
increases up to an income per capita of about $5000 (1987 PPP) and then declines. Best
primacy levels in a medium size country are quite high at the peak, amounting to 1/4 of
the national urban population being in the largest city. The list of countries with highly
excessive primacy includes the usual suspects such as Argentina, Chile, Peru,
Bangladesh, Thailand, Japan, Congo, France, and Greece. Remaining columns in Table 3
demonstrate the effect of excessive urban primacy on economic growth and the role that
transport policy can play in the process. The economic growth rate loss from excessive
primacy (primacy one standard deviation above the best level) rises with income and then
flattens out at a very high level. The growth rate losses of 1.6% correspond to the losses
from reductions in investment or education rates by one standard deviation in growth
model econometrics. Finally the indirect effect on economic growth rates of increasing
road investment to reduce primacy in excessive primacy countries rises with income to a
high level. Transport investment can play a key role in reducing excessive concentration
and that has very positive effects on growth rates. The form of national urbanization-- the
degree of urban concentration-- matters very much in a country and inter-regional
infrastructure investment plays a key role in the process.
21Table 3: The Effect on Annual Economic Growth Rates of Urban Concentration and
National Transport Infrastructure in Medium Size Country.
The  optimal  degree  Loss  in  growth  rate  Growth  effect  of a one
of urban  primacy  (%  from  excessive  standard  deviation
population  of  primacy  (one  increase  in road  density
medium  size  country standard  deviation)  in a country  with
in largest  city).  excessive  primacy
Low  income  ($1100)  15  .71  .23
Medium  income  ($4900)  25  1.6  .68
High  income  ($13400)  23  1.6  .68
The  table  looks  at a medium  size  country  --national  urban  population  of  22 million.  Numbers  for
countries  with  urban  populations  of  up  to 50-60  million  are  similar.  The  first  column  calculates  the
degree  of  urban  primacy  that  maximizes  growth  rates  and  steady  state  income  levels.  Error  bands  about
this  for  medium  or higher  income  countries  are  quite  tight  (standard  error  of .018).  The  growth  losses  of
excessive  primacy  are  high,  although  more  so,  as  income  rises.  The  role  of transport  investment  (length
of  the  national  road  system  divided  by  national  land  area)  is  quite  significant,  particularly  as countries
enter  middle  income  phases  when  deconcentration  becomes  critical.
5.4 The anatomy of deconcentration of industry and population.
In the initial stages of industrialization countries tend to concentrate industry in one or
two major cities, following the Williamson hypothesis, and then at some point industry
starts to deconcentrate. The details of this process are of interest. Deconcentration of
industry is more dramatic than that of population, and it transforms the industrial bases of
the largest metro areas. Initial industrial deconcentration is generally into the suburban
and ex-urban areas of the major city and then into nearby satellite cities, but all within,
say, 60 kilometers of the original city.  Such deconcentration usually raises issues of
suburban sprawl and environmental degradation. Industry and workers move en masse,
often in just a 2-3 year year period, into nearby rural areas that do not have the
administrative capacity and skills to plan for appropriate infrastructure investments and
land use development, nor for regulation of industrial polluters. The second wave is into
hinterland areas, both cities and rural areas, away from the domain of the major metro
area(s). The process has been studied for Brazil (Townroe, 1981 and Hansen, 1968) and
Korea (Chun and Lee, 1985 and Henderson, Lee, and Lee, 1999).
Recent evidence is available for Korea (again). Part 1 of Table 4 shows Seoul's
peak in urban primacy occurred around 1970. Part 2 shows that, while Kyonggi province
(in which Seoul is located) has not changed its share of population greatly, its share of
22manufacturing has declined enormously since 1970. That decline involved massive
industrial movement in the late 1970's and early 1980's from the main Seoul metro area to
nearby satellite cities, involving most industries, but especially chemicals and primary
and fabricated metals.
Table 4: Urban Deconcentration in Korea
Part 1. Metro Seoul's Primacy
1960  1970  1980  1990
Share of national urban  34  41  38  33
population
Part 2. Metro Seoul's Share of Population and Manufacturing in Kyonggi Province'
_______  _  1970  1980  1983  1993
Population  62  63  67  61
Manufacturing  76  61  45  30
*excludes Inchon metro area
Part 3. Share of National Manufacturing Employment
1983  -1993
Seoul  2114
Pusan  and Taegu  23  14
"Satellite"  metro  areas  30  30
Other  cities,  other  rural areas  12  17
Rural a:reas of satellite  city provinces  14  25
The key reason to move out of Seoul was lower wage and lands rents; but the
impediment was the need for access to the bureaucracy in Seoul, in a context where the
economy was still highly regulated. Kwon (1985) suggests plants would only relocate to
places within a 3/4 hour drive from Seoul. Part 3 of table 4 shows the deconcentration of
industry from the three major metro areas of Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu and their satellite
cities into the rest of the country. This deconcentration occurred after the massive
investments in roads and communications blanketing Korea in the late 1970's and early
1980's and after the economic liberalization of the early 1980's that helped diminish
industrial ties to the government. In just 10 years, the shares of the three metro areas in
national manufacturing employment fell by 36% and the shares of satellite cities
remained the same. The shares of other cities and rural areas grew dramatically,
23increasing from a 26% share in 1983 to 42% in 1993, this in a time period when their
populations fell by 9%! This points out a key feature of the deconcentration process.
While actual and desired (see table 3) population deconcentration is fairly modest after
the peak, manufacturing deconcentration can be dramatic. Hinterlands, if accessible by
transport and modem communications, offer lower wage and rent costs, proximity to
natural resources including traditional, albeit lower skill populations, and improved
congestion and environmental conditions.
While Korea is a not a large country geographically, this deconcentration of
industry into hinterlands of larger developing countries has been studied for both Brazil
(Townroe, 1981 and Hansen 1983) and Mexico (Hanson, 1996), quite apart from the
analysis of historical USA (Cronon, 1992). For Brazil the deconcentration of industry
from Grande Sao Paulo to lower wage populated hinterland cities followed the transport
corridors first through Sao Paulo state and then into Minas Gerais, the interior state with
the main iron ore and other mineral reserves.  Deconcentration may involve provinces
(each achieving wide diversity in production) so that many are producing a similar range
of products, while trade increases across provinces (in intra-industry parts and
components) and increases within provinces across cities that become more industrialized
and specialized.
5.5  Long run city dynamics: lessons from developed countries
Based on work covering the last century in Japan and France (Eaton and Eckstein
1997) and in the USA (Black and Henderson 1  999a and 1  999b), we know that the
populations of cities tend to grow continuously over time. In the USA, over the last
century, the average, median, and maximum size city have all increased in size by 4-5
fold. Technological developments affecting commuting and other service provision lower
the costs of having larger city populations. In addition, on-going local knowledge
accumulations that interact with scale externalities enhance the benefits of larger cities,,  as
noted earlier and as modeled in Black and Henderson (1999b). While growth in city sizes
in the USA has slowed in recent years, it is reasonable to expect typical sizes to continue
rapid growth in developing countries.
24Growth in city sizes tends to be "parallel", with the relative size distribution of
cities being remarkably stable over time. Eaton and Eckstein show that the larger cities
and towns in France and Japan tend to grow at the same rate, maintaining the same
relative size distribution. Henderson (1988) notes the stability of city size distributions
for other countries such as Brazil and India. Black and Henderson (1999a) show that, for
the USA, the 1900 and 1990 relative size distributions almost perfectly overlap, although
there is a modest increase in concentration near the top end in recent decades. In addition
to city sizes increasing, the numbers of cities has grown as well. Depending on
definitions of a metro area (in 1900 and in 1990) the number of metro areas in the USA
has grown by 50-200% over the period.
Beeson et al (1999) and Black and Henderson (1999b) point out a key feature of
city growth and the size distribution of cities. While there is remarkable stability of the
overall size distribution of cities over time, there is also mobility of cities through that
size distribution. Over the last century, some new and existing small cities have grown to
be very large. Some medium size cities have stagnated and shrunk in relative size,
although remarkably few metro areas ever have absolute population losses. However,
consistent with Eaton and Eckstein's observations on France and Japan, in the USA there
is almost no downward relative size mobility at the top end.  Cities in the top ten
percentiles of the size distribution in 1900 are all there in 1990, although since the
number of cities has expanded, there have been additions to the list of cities in the top ten
percentiles.
The big stay big for two sets of reasons, even though they typically radically
change production compositions over the decades. First they have "history" on their side
(built-up physical infrastructure and housing that would have to be abandoned in order
for cities to shrink absolutely) and second, they have a base of accumulated local
knowledge, institutions and traditions that gives them a strong competitive advantage.
And not inconsequentially, they have the political influence to help shape national policy
to their advantage. For the USA, Black and Henderson note that the older major cities in
the North-East and mid-West have held their relative sizes because they are in more
densely populated regions with high market demand, or demand for each other's
25products. New major metro areas in the South and West have arisen to take advantage of
the natural coastal and climatic amenities in parts of those regions.
6. Geography, development, and policy.
Pulling all these strands together we conclude that geography matters for
development, but that economic growth is not governed by a geographical determinism.
Costs of remoteness can be reduced, and new economic centers can develop.  Ireland's
GDP grew by 70% between 1987-97 as it benefited from integration in the EU, and major
new economic hubs can form, as in the coastal regions of China. Policy is instrumental
in shaping these changes, although the design of policy is not well understood.  What
sorts of policy are effective in altering the economic geography of countries or cities?
Given the presence of multiple market failures, what are the welfare implications of such
policies, both for directly affected locations and for the world as a whole?
Policy issues arise in a number of contexts, the first of which is international.
Here it seems clear that the costs of remoteness can be reduced by policy to facilitate
trade and investment flows and to bring countries into the world trading system.
However, it is also clear that the package of policy measures required goes well beyond
simple reductions in border tariffs and quotas.  Tariff liberalization may perhaps be
necessary for successful participation in the world economy, but it might not be
sufficient, as real costs of distance remain.  These can be mitigated by.  infrastructure
improvements, measures to improve port facilities and policies to reform customs and
other border procedures, although the cost-effectiveness of such measures remains to be
studied.
Many countries are attracted by regional integration schemes as ways of opening
their economies to trade.  Thinking geographically sheds new light on these regional
trading arrangements.  South-South arrangements between developing countries have the
effect of enlarging markets and possibly thereby promoting industrialization.  But if
industry concentrates due to agglomeration forces, then gains are likely to go to one
member country at the expense of others.  Both analytical and empirical study of this
issue suggests that the likelihood of integration causing divergence is greatest in 'south-
26south' agreements, and developing countries are likely to be better served by entering
'north-south' regional agreements (World Bank 2000).
Perhaps the most important international issue relates to attracting footloose
industry and developing a viable cluster of activities. Here, it is much easier to point to
necessary conditions than to sufficient ones.  Geographical analysis alerts us to the
importance of linkages and density of activity, and the difficulty of attracting activity to
remote locations.  A large array of policy instruments have been used in the past to try to
influence the location decisions of footloose industries. These instruments include fiscal
subsidies (including tax holidays) with their potential for race to the bottom type tax
competition, the provision of infrastructure in industrial estates and free trade zones, the
improvement of trunk infrastructure and key transshipment nodes, the provision of a
trained labor force, etc. None of these instruments have been systematically successful,
and many have been very costly. More empirical research, with better specified counter-
factuals, is necessary to evaluate the efficacy of these policies and programs and the
contexts in which they are likely to succeed or fail.  One of the areas in which more
research is needed before policy instruments are activated is the international relocation
of industry, identifying which sectors move from clusters most readily, and which sectors
create the greatest linkages in the host economy.
The second policy context is the management of urban structures. Here the
literature gives two important messages.  The first is the importance of concentration.
We saw the efficiency gains associated with density, and policy should not inhibit
achievement of these gains (particularly in an environment where to do so would risk
international relocation of industry).  Second, deconcentration does occur at a certain
stage in a country's development. Policies that promote this - positively, rather than by
damaging the existing centers - can be effective. Here again from a policy perspective it
is important to determine when the level of concentration is insufficient or excessive.
Many countries have had active policies and programs to discourage migration of labor
or investment to the largest cities (from outright prohibition, to limiting the provision of
housing and other supporting infrastructure). They also had active programs to
encourage deconcentration of economic activity to targeted areas outside the major
agqlomerations by improving the acquired characteristics of the targeted locations.  Some
27of these programs have been successful and others not.  But rarely have the effectiveness
and the costs and benefits of the programs been evaluated critically (ex-ante or ex-post).
Moreover, many ostensibly non-spatial policies, such as policies and programs to benefit
specific sectors or household groups, have spatial consequences because the targeted
sectors and households are not distributed uniformly across space. Sometimes these non-
spatial policies can dominate explicit spatial policies thereby offsetting or negating the
intended consequences of the latter.
One of the most difficult questions is; what to do with lagging regions, often
remote and perhaps sparsely populated? Here we see most starkly the fundamental
spatial policy issue of whether it is more cost-effective to move people or to move jobs.
Can we identify thresholds of remoteness (distance) and critical mass of economic
activity below which a region is unlikely to ever stand a chance of viable development
(i.e. exploiting increasing returns and the potential for clustering for some subset of
economic activities)? Despite many studies on regional convergence, we lack
comprehensive studies of convergence in different countries at different stages of
development, which would indicate for what types of region, under what policy regimes,
and at what points in time convergence is likely.  The question of whether to move
people or jobs is most evident within countries, but also has an international dimension.
What is the role of international migration - and of brain-drains - in changing
international inequalities, and what should be the policy stance to such flows?
Developing answers to these and other policy issues requires a good deal of
further work. Theory is needed, to see through the full equilibrium implications of policy
measures, and to be able to assess the likely effects of other changes, such as new
technologies that change the costs of distance. New applied analytical tools are needed,
such as a cost-benefit analysis that can take into account the linkages - technological and
pecuniary -- that lie at the basis of many location decisions, and that can address the
discontinuous and non-marginal changes that policy might induce. And more empirical
work is needed to further quantify the strength of many of the forces that we have
discussed. As stated above, we know little about the strength of linkages due to
pecuniary externalities, little about the location of service activities, and little about the
complementarities between services and the rest of the economy. Agglomeration can
28arise from direct technological spillovers, thicker labor markets, better access to suppliers
and larger product markets, but many of these benefits have not yet been quantified
through empirical work. Even for topics on which we have cited empirical studies such as
how trade, investment, and the transmission of technology fall off sharply with distance,
little is known about the strength of these relationships in developing countries.
Finally, one useful exercise that has yet to be undertaken is to relate the
theoretical implications of the new economic geography literature in a more systematic
way to the observations and insights of traditional urban and regional economics.  Which
of the latter results have a clearer theoretical underpinning now, which are inconsistent
with the new theory, and what earlier observations and findings remain still without
adequate theoretical foundations?
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Endnotes
i Throughout the paper we use the term geography to mean the spatial relationship
between economic units, not countries' endowments of land, resources, mountains, etc.
i  Krugman (1995) argues that the difficulty in modelling increasing returns to scale was
largely responsible for the marginalisation of geography by mainstream economists.
'ii  There could still be spatial concentration in the sense of Ellison-Glaeser (1997),
where, for example, rural populations might concentrate near mineral fields to save on
transport costs of the raw materials for their family steel production.
iv  This and the following section draw heavily on Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
The importance of aggregate demand and increasing returns for development was
analysed by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny  (1989), although not in a spatial context.
v,  This argument is developed in Venables (1996a).  Having more suppliers may also
make the market structure more competitive and thereby reduce price cost margins.  For a
development application of this argument see Venables (1996b).
vii See also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
vii  See Radelet and Sachs (1998)
.x Shipping costs fell with the introduction of containerization, and vary with the oil price.
In recent decades technical change in this sector has been no faster than in other sectors.
x Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994) relate industry productivity growth to activity
levels in customer industries, although this work has no spatial dimension.
xi  What is meant by convergence is not always well understood. There is general mean
reversion where, on average high income [low] regions grow slower [faster], but the
variance in income across regions doesn't narrow over time. There is conditional
convergence where regions are converging to different steady states and there is absolute
convergence where regions are converging to roughly the same steady state.
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